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Abstract 
This paper analyzes the effects of the reforms initiated in India following the balance of 
payments (BOP) crisis of 1991 on economic performance. We do not find persuasive the 
contention of many analysts that growth accelerated after the mid-1980s when reforms were 
initiated. Nor does statistical analysis support the contention that reforms in the mid-1980s 
resulted in a growth acceleration. We show that there is an accelerating rate of growth of GDP 
after the mid 1970s and it is difficult to relate this gradual acceleration to specific policy 
changes. The changed policies in the 1980s did not mean a basic change in the policy 
framework. Furthermore, since corporate investment as a share of GDP did not increase in the 
1980s it is difficult to identify the mechanism by which the more pro-business policies of the 
government were translated to higher growth as claimed by Rodrik and Subramaniam (2005).  
We show that increasing exports of goods, non-factor services, and labour services, 
through remittances, played an important role in growth in India. Furthermore, the share of 
exports of goods and services grew as rapidly in India as in China, so that it cannot be said that 
growth in India was based more on domestic demand. The increased value of exports of 
manufactures was important as their value grew from about 16 percent of the manufacturing 
sector’s value added in the early 1980s to about 60 percent currently. Also, there is no significant 
difference between the growth rates of value-added in the manufacturing and services sectors 
except for the period of the Ninth Plan (1997-2001).  
We find that most of 12 economic indicators show improved performance in the decade 
2001-10 compared to the earlier decade 1981-1990. The better performance consisted both in the 
level and lower variability. Furthermore, we find that the reforms had a gradual effect; the 
change in the period 1992-2000 was smaller and statistically less significant.  
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We also find that the differences with East Asia and particularly China depend on the 
basis of the comparison. We compare changes in performance since the reforms, which started in 
China in 1979 and in India in 1991. Such a comparison shows more similarities than differences.                     
We finally examine social progress. We find that South Asia lags behind other regions in making 
progress towards the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and India lags behind other South 
Asian countries. The responsiveness of the improvement in the MDGs to increases in per capita 
income is usually low in Asia and particularly in India. 
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Section I Introduction  
 
This paper analyzes the effects of the reforms initiated in India following the balance of 
payments (BOP) crisis of 1991 on the development strategy adopted by the government, its 
policies and the actual economic performance. We first discuss in Section II the significance of 
the 1991 reforms as there is a debate on when reforms started, as a number of analysts claim that 
reforms started in the mid-eighties and that is why growth started accelerating in the 1980s. We 
next examine the features of India’s growth. India’s growth experience is often contrasted with 
that of East Asia and more particularly China. It is claimed that savings rates though increasing 
are considerably lower than in East Asia; growth in India is based on the services sector rather 
than manufacturing which was the leading sector in East Asia; and again unlike East Asia India 
has not attracted much foreign direct investment (FDI) (Kotwal, Ramaswami and Wadhwa, 
2011).   
We argue below in Section II that while there were certain changes in policies in the 
1980s as there had been in earlier years, these did not mean a basic change in the policy 
framework. The resilience of the economy as it recovered quickly from economic crises 
encouraged the government to persist with the import substituting industrialization strategy it had 
adopted.  However, research conclusions of various committees set up by the government to 
study the effects of licensing and import controls and the experience of other countries especially 
China resulted in policy makers believing that a change in the growth model was needed and the 
1991 crisis provided the opportunity to carry out such a chnage. We show that there is an 
accelerating rate of growth of GDP after the mid 1970s and it is difficult to relate this gradual 
acceleration to specific policy changes. Furthermore, since corporate investment as a share of 
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GDP did not increase in the 1980s it is difficult to identify the mechanism by which the more 
pro-business policies of the government were translated into higher growth as claimed by Rodrik 
and Subramaniam (2005).  
In Section III we examine the claims that growth in India was more fuelled by domestic 
demand and less outwardly oriented than say in China, and, also, that it is more service oriented. 
We show that increasing exports of goods, non-factor services, and labour services, through 
remittances, have played an important role. Furthermore, the share of exports of goods and 
services grew as rapidly in India as in China. Also, there is no significant difference between the 
growth rates of value-added in the manufacturing and services sectors except for the period of 
the Ninth Plan (1997-2001). The increased value of exports of manufactures was important as 
their value grew from about 16 percent of the manufacturing sector’s value added in the early 
1980s to about 60 percent currently. 
In Section IV we examine the behavior of 12 economic indicators and find that most 
show improved performance in the decade 2001-10 relative to the earlier decade 1981-1990. The 
better performance consisted both in the level and lower variability. Furthermore, we find that 
the reforms had a gradual effect; the change in the period 1992-2000 was smaller and statistically 
less significant. While exports of goods increased, imports increased even faster so the deficit on 
the balance of trade in goods became larger;
1
 but was usually covered by an increasing surplus 
on service trade and the rise in remittances. However, since the financial crisis this has not been 
the case and the current account deficit has increased considerably. For most of the period 
private capital inflows were larger than the current account deficit leading to reserve 
                                                          
1 The importance of India as an importer of goods in the international market grew more 
rapidly relative to its income than China’s leading to India usually running a deficit on 
merchandise trade while China ran a surplus. 
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accumulation. Increasing trade along with rising private capital flows, both inward and outward, 
reflects the increasing integration of India with the world economy.  
 We also find in section IV that the differences with East Asia and particularly China 
depend on the basis of the comparison. This can be seen if we take into account that the reforms 
in China started in 1979 and in India in 1991 and that the staring points in these two years were 
very different for the two countries. Such a comparison shows more similarities than differences. 
For instance, the share of services in GDP increased between 1974-82 and 2001-10 by more than 
85 percent in China and only 32 percent in India (Agarwal and Whalley, 2013). However, the 
share of services was much higher in India in 1992 than in China in 1979. If we examine the 
change in the share of services in GDP for about the first twenty years of reform, the share 
increased by 24.2 percent in China and 21.2 percent in India.  
We finally examine social progress in Section V. We find that South Asia lags behind 
other regions n making progress towards the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)and India 
lags behind other South Asian countries. The responsiveness of the improvement in the MDGs to 
increases in per capita income is usually low in Asia and particularly in India. 
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Section II The 1991 Indian Policy Reform 
 
The 1991 reforms which followed a balance of payment crisis resulted in a fundamental 
re-orientation of Indian policy unlike what had usually happened in previous crises. Policy 
adjustments had been made after previous crises but the broad strategy had remained the same. 
The basic objectives of policy had remained constant since independence: rapid growth, poverty 
removal, a more equitable income distribution and self-sufficiency
1
 though the relative weights 
of the different objectives varied over time. These objectives were to be reached through the 
adoption of an import substituting industrialization strategy in which the state would play a 
prominent part through its almost total monopoly of production of capital goods and important 
intermediate goods.
2
 Policy changed as the relative importance of the different objectives varied 
and when the constraints facing the economy changed.
3
  One of the consequences of the crisis 
was usually a drop in the investment ratio which recovered only after a considerable lag. For 
instance, after gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) as a percentage of gross domestic product 
(GDP) reached a peak of 15.9 per cent in 1957-58 it fell after the 1957-58 BOP crisis and did not 
recover to the earlier ratio till 1963--64 (RBI 2012). The fall in the GFCF ratio after the 1965-67 
                                                          
1 The meaning of self-sufficiency itself has varied over time. Usually it meant ability to resist 
external pressures to change policies, particularly foreign policies. In the preparation for the 
Fifth Plan, because of experience since the mid-sixties when aid was sought to be used to 
pressurize India to change its policies on Vietnam and later on Bangladesh, self-sufficiency was 
taken to mean reaching a stage where there was no need for aid.  
2 Most development analysts in the 1950s e.g. Rosenstein-Rodan (1943), Prebisch (1950), 
Nurkse (1953), Arthur Lewis (1954), argued for an import substituting industrialization 
strategy For a discussion of their views see Agarwal (1991). One of the reasons for the state to 
control these important sectors was to establish a more equitable income distribution. 
3 For instance, self-sufficiency became more important after the cut off of aid because of 
disagreements over India’s policy over Viet Nam (Bowles, 1971) and over the events leading to 
the creation of Bangladesh. For a discussion of the varying constraints and their effect on policy 
see Agarwal, 1997. 
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crisis was particularly severe ---from 20.4 per cent to 16.7 per cent---and it did not recover till 
1977-78. 
One of the consequences of the many travails the economy faced after the mid-1960s, 
droughts in 1965-1967, cut-off of aid by the US and the World Bank in 1968, the influx of 
refugees in 1971 from then East Pakistan and the ensuing war and later the oil and food price 
increases in 1973, was lower public sector investment resulting in considerable excess capacity 
in the capital goods sector and very high capital output ratios.
1
 Many policy analysts analyzed 
this imbalance between the structure of demand and the structure of production and saw 
increased government investment as a solution (Chakravarty, 1979). Once structural adjustment 
was complete, the savings rate of both households and the government rose, the government 
raised its investments. It also stopped running a conservative fiscal policy to raise expenditures 
and started running deficits and since then budget deficits have been the rule and usually have 
been large.  
 Rodrik and Subramaniam (2005) do not believe that these higher government 
expenditures can explain the improved economic performance in the 1980s. They argue while 
they may raise GDP they would not have resulted in the higher growth of TFP which is observed 
in this period. But if the higher growth is because of better capacity utilization then one can 
expect higher TFP growth unless capacity utilization is taken into account in the measurement of 
capital. The incremental capital output ratio which was over 6 during the period 1966-73, a 
period of low growth and considerable excess capacity, dropped to 4 in the 1980s, a figure 
similar to that in the East Asian region. Also one would expect that in a country with fixed 
                                                          
1 The low growth during 1966-1973 in what was essentially a period of structural adjustment 
implied a low growth over the period 1951-and the mid 1970s and has been dubbed as the 
‘Hindu rate of growth’ despite higher growth in the period from the early 1950s to the mid 1960s. 
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exchange rates and no capital flows increased government expenditures would raise income, 
however, at the expense of increased current account deficits and higher interest rates (Kenen, 
2000). The adverse effect of higher interest rates on private investment was sought to be 
neutralized by fiscal incentives such as accelerated depreciation. Also, development of the 
capital market meant that much of investments by the large companies were financed by the 
capital markets rather than banks. The government was able to prevent a sharp drop in corporate 
investment as a share of GDP; but there was no increase in the 1980s. The increase in investment 
was almost entirely in the public sector. Also, despite providing a number of incentives to 
exporters it was not able to prevent the stagnation in the share of exports to GDP and the 
emergence of an increasing current account deficit which ultimately resulted in the 1991 BOP 
crisis. 
Some analysts believe that liberalization in the 1980s contributed to the improved 
performance of that period. There was some easing of import licensing for capital goods and 
some intermediate goods and also for expansion of capacity by large enterprises (Bhagwati, 
1993, Panagariya, 2008). But the overall trade regime remained severely protectionist. Tariffs 
remained high and the effective rates of protection did not fall in the 1980s (Kotwal, Ramaswami 
and Wadhwa, 2011). Also there was no drop in the percent of manufactured imports subject to 
non-tariff barriers (Kotwal, Ramaswami and Wadhwa, 2011). There undoubtedly was some 
liberalization. The open general license (OGL) list which was begun in 1976 with only 79 capital 
goods in the list covered almost 30 percent imports by 1990 (Panagariya, 2008). But we believe 
that this liberalization was modest and more in the nature of policy adjustments that are often 
undertaken by governments. Tariff revenues as a percent of imports remained high. Furthermore, 
the almost constant share of corporate investment in GDP casts doubt on the effect of loosening 
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capacity expansion restrictions on raising growth rates.  Rodrik and Subramaniam (2005) ascribe 
the improvement in the 1980s not to specific policy changes but to the adoption by the 
government of a more pro-business attitude which encouraged private sector growth.  But since 
corporate investment did not rise as a share of GDP, which it has since 1991, it is difficult to 
identify the mechanism through which the government’s pro-business policy resulted in higher 
growth. 
Statistical analysis to identify a structural break in GDP growth do not find a break in 
the mid 1980s. Wallack (2003) finds a break in 1980, Rodrik and Subramaniam (2004) in 1979, 
Balakrishnan and Parameswaran (2007) in 1979-80, Basu (2008) and Sen (2007) find it in 1975-
76. All show a break before the liberalization of the 1980s. There has been gradual acceleration 
in growth since the mid 1970s after the adjustment to the various crises beginning in 1965 was 
completed. The growth of GDP which had fallen to 3.4 percent a year during the Fourth Plan, 
1969-73, rose to 5 percent in the Fifth Plan (1974-78) and further to 5.5 percent in the Sixth Plan 
(1980-84)  and 5.6 percent in the Seventh (1985-89) and has continued to accelerate. It is 
difficult to identify this acceleration with specific policies.  
The development strategy was retained till 1991 despite mounting evidence of its 
harmful effects. Research abroad (Little, Scitovsky and Scott, 1970, Bhagwati, 1978, Krueger, 
1978) had shown import substitution policies to be inefficient. Commissions (Abid Hussain, 
Narasimham) set up by the Government of  India had also documented the inefficiencies 
engendered by the high tariff regime and by the system of licensing that went with it.
1
 Policy 
makers were convinced that the basic model of import substitution needed a change.
2
 The 
                                                          
1 The inefficiencies had been identified and analyzed earlier ( Bhagwati and Desai, 1970,  and 
Bhagwati and Srinivasan, 1975)  
2 The high growth rates achieved by China another large economy were more difficult to brush 
11 
 
rationale for a large public sector producing capital goods no longer held since in an open 
economy there was no equivalence between the size of the capital goods sector and the 
investment rate.
1
 But the economy had been resilient. The effect of the BOP crises on growth 
was usually short-lived, despite the slowdown in investment as noted above. The growth rate of 
GDP fell to -1.2 per cent in 1957--58 before it recovered to 7.6 per cent in the following year. 
Similarly, the growth rate declined from 4.7 per cent in 1973-74 to 1.3 per cent in 1974-75 
before recovering to 9.1 per cent in 1975--76, and declined from 5.5 per cent in 1978--79 to -5 
per cent in 1979--80 before increasing to 7.2 per cent in 1980--81.
2
 The exception was the crisis 
during the years 1965--67 when the interruption in growth was much more substantial, and had 
resulted in a much greater adjustment of policies than was usually the case. 
But policy makers had come to believe that the prevailing model was no longer 
sustainable and needed to be changed. The 1991 crisis provided the opportunity to bring about a 
fundamental change in development strategy, an abandonment of the import substitution model, 
reducing sharply the role of the public sector and much less importance being given to the 
objective of reducing income disparities. Reliance on the public sector lessened and more 
importance was accorded to the private sector. This shift coincided with a change in the concern 
about income distribution. Concern shifted from income distribution as such to reducing poverty 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
aside than the success of smaller countries such as Kore, Taiwan, Singapore and Hong Kong.  
1 The Second Plan’s analytical basis was the Mahalanobis model which was of a closed economy 
and where therefore the savings and investment rate equaled the share of the capital goods 
sector in total output. The greater the investment in the capital goods sector the larger its share 
in total output and the higher the savings and investment ratios and higher the growth rate. 
For a discussion of the Mahalanobis model see Bhagwati and Chakravarty (1969).  Also there is 
a difference depending on whether one assumes that capital is shiftable namely can be used at 
any time in either the consumer goods sector or the capital goods sector or that it is non-
shiftable, namely, once it is alloCated to the consumer goods or the capital goods sector it cannot 
be shifted to the other sector. see Chakravarty (1969).  
2 The large variation in growth rates was due to the effects of the BOP position as well as 
fluctuations in agricultural output caused by variations in rainfall. 
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and improving the condition of the poor. Consequently, the Rural Employment Guarantee 
Scheme that provided 100 days of employment to each poor rural family was implemented; the 
Right to Education Act was passed. In 2011, the National Food Security Act 2011, which 
guarantees subsidised food to 50 % of the urban population and 75 % of the rural population, was 
proposed. Disputes about its provisions have prevented its enactment as yet. 
Tariffs on manufactures were reduced from an average of about 100 percent and a peak 
of almost 400 percent first to an average of about 30 percent. Currently, the average is under 10 
percent (World Bank, 2011). Peaks have also been reduced. Furthermore, QRs which were 
ubiquitous have been almost eliminated. On agriculture they were converted to tariffs as part of 
the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture; the remaining QRs had to be eliminated when 
India lost the dispute brought by the US to the WTO. Licensing has been eliminated; the number 
of industries reserved for the small scale sector which prevented the setting up of plants of 
optimal size has been reduced and large enterprises can enter even those reserved  for the small 
scale if at least 50 percent of the output is exported.  FDI and portfolio inflows have been 
liberalized; outward FDI had also been liberalized leading to large outflows by private industry.
1
 
  
                                                          
1 Changes in policies are described in the Annual Economic Survey published by the Ministry of 
Finance every year just before the budget is presented to parliament.  
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Section III Growth in the Indian Economy 
 
The Indian economy has been on an accelerating growth path since the mid 1970s for 
over three decades (Table 1). The financial crisis of 2008 has resulted in the growth rate 
becoming more variable. While the crisis lowered the growth rate from 9.7 % in 2007-08 to 6.5 
% in 2008-09, the economy recovered quickly to grow at 7.9 % in 2009-10 and 8.3 % in 2010-
11. But the high rate of growth has not been sustained and declined to 7 percent in 2011-12.    
Table 1 Growth Rate of GDP and Major Sectors in India 
Plans              GDP   Agriculture    Manufacturing     Services               
6
Th
   (80-84)     5.4           5.7                  5.1                    5.4 
7
Th
   (85-89)     5.6           2.8                  6.0                    6.1 
8
Th
   (92-96)     6.6           4.7                  9.4                    6.8 
9
Th
   (97-01)     5.7           2.4                  3.3                    7.8 
10
Th
 (02-06)     7.6           2.4                  9.3                  10.1   
11
th
  (07-10)     7.9           3.2                  7.9                  10.0 
Source Reserve Bank of India 2012. 
 
The acceleration in the rate of growth is partly because of the greater weight that faster 
growing sectors achieved over the years because of their faster growth.  For instance if we apply 
the growth rates for the sectors during the 11
th
 Plan to the sector shares during the 6
th
 Plan the 
overall growth rate would be 6.7%. But if we apply the same growth rates to the sector shares in 
the 11
th
 Plan the overall growth rate is 8.2% a full 1.5% greater. The share of the slow growing 
agricultural sector has been declining (Table 3).  But another important feature of the growth 
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acceleration is the higher growth rate of the services sector. There has been a sharp acceleration 
in the rate of growth of value added in services from the eighties to the nineties and further in 
this century (Table 1).   
Is this acceleration in growth of GDP and the faster growth of the services sector 
significant? The annual rates of growth of output in the agriculture, manufacturing and services 
sectors and the mean growth rates and the standard deviation in growth rates for the periods 
1981-90, 1992-2000 and 2001-10 have been calculated. A comparison of the sector growth rates 
for the periods 1981-90 and 1992-2000 shows that the difference in average growth rates over 
the two periods is significant only for services at the 10 % level when a two-tailed t-test is 
applied. A comparison of sector growth between 1992-2000 and 2000-2010 shows no 
differences in sector growth rates that were significant, the difference in the growth rates for 
services was just under the 10% significance level. When, however, the difference in mean 
growth rates between the 1981-1990 and 2001-10 periods is tested the difference in the growth 
rates for services is significant at the 1% level; the other sector growth rates are not significantly 
different. So there is an acceleration in the rate of growth of services though this does not happen 
for the other sectors. 
What about the growth rates of the manufacturing and service sectors? The average 
growth rate for services during the period 1980-1996 is 6.4 percent, not statistically different 
from the 6.3 percent growth rate for manufacturing during that period. Again the average growth 
rates for the two sectors are not significantly different for the period 2002-10, except for the year 
2008 (Table 2). The significant difference is during the Ninth Plan (Table 1). The large reduction 
in tariff rates for imports of manufactures could have resulted in a shrinking of the sector as 
happened in many Latin American countries where the share of manufactures in GDP has 
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declined. In India, seemingly the devaluation of the rupee has compensated for the reduction in 
protection. The importance of exports has increased for the manufacturing sector. The percent of 
value of exports to value added in manufacturing has increase from 16.4 percent in the 6th Plan 
(1980-84) to almost 60 percent in the period 2007-10. This devaluation of the rupee has had an 
even stronger effect on exports of services and this has contributed to a higher rate of growth for 
the services sector. 
Table 2 Annual Rates of Growth of Indian Value-Added (Per cent) 
                                    Manufacturing     Services 
1997                                    .05                     8.00  
1998                                  3.13                     8.36 
1999                                  5.39                   10.99      
2000                                  7.30                    5.37 
2001                                  2.77                    6.88 
2002                                  6.87                    6.97 
2003                                  6.34                    8.06      
2004                                  7.38                    8.12 
2005                                10.10                   10.91  
2006                                14.32                   10.06 
2007                                10.28                   10.27  
2008                                 4.33                      9.98 
2009                                 9.66                    10.45     
2010                                 7.56                     9.35 
Source World Bank Databank http://databank.worldbank.org/ddp/home.do 
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   Table 3  Structure of the Indian Economy (% of GDP) 
Plans                  Agriculture    Manufacturing     Services              
6
Th
   (80-84)              41.0                 14.6               37.1 
7
Th
   (85-89)              36.6                 15.9               40.1 
8
Th
   (92-96)              32.3                 17.1               43.1 
9
Th
   (97-01)              27.5                 17.1               47.9 
10
Th
 (02-06)              19.6                 15.5               52.9 
11
th
  (07-10)              18.1                 15.1               54.2 
Source Reserve Bank of India 2012. 
 
Despite this acceleration, the share of services in GDP in India, defined as a low middle 
income country by the World Bank, while higher than the average is not exceptional. The 
average for low income countries is 50 percent and for low middle income countries is 48 
percent. Where India deviates significantly from other low middle income countries is in the 
share of manufacturing which averages 26 percent for low middle income countries as against 
India’s 15 percent, and this share has come down in the past decade in India. Furthermore, the 
share of services in GDP increased between 1974-82 and 2001-10 by 85.3 percent in China 
whereas it increased by only 32 percent in India. In Korea it increased by over 33 percent in this 
period. In Malaysia and Indonesia in South East Asia it hardly increased and in Thailand it fell.
1
 
Also, the share of manufacturing in GDP fell from 38.0 percent to 32.1 percent in China during 
this period and in India it fell from 16 percent to 15.2 percent. 
                                                          
1 For a broader analysis of the similarities and differences in economic performance in China 
and India since the reforms see Agarwal and Whalley (2012).  
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                          Table 4 Structure of Demand in India (% of GDP) 
PLANS               Household        Government          Gross Fixed           Exports 
                          Consumption     Consumption    Capital Formation       of G&S 
6
Th
   (80-84)         76.9                       10.5                      19.8                      6.2  
7
Th
   (85-89)         71.7                       12.0                       22.7                     5.9 
8
Th
   (92-96)         65.4                       11.0                        24.3                   10.2  
9
Th
   (97-01)         65.0                       12.3                        24.3                   12.1  
10
Th
 (02-06)         59.9                       11.0                        27.8                    17.4  
11
th
 (07-10)          57.2                       11.2                        31.3                    21.4 
Source World Bank Databank http://databank.worldbank.org/ddp/home.do 
 
The growth acceleration has been accompanied by a shift in the pattern of demand from 
household consumption to capital formation, which has increased as a share of GDP by about 50 
percent since the 1991 crisis and to exports of goods and services (Table 4).
1
Correspondingly, 
the share of household consumption in GDP has decreased.  
The big change has been in the share of exports in GDP; exports of goods, non-factor 
services and of labour services have all increased significantly (Table 5). The share of 
merchandise exports in GDP which had stagnated in the 1980s
2
 increased rapidly since 1991, 
more than tripling. Remittances from migrant workers, which usually comes under the heading 
of private transfers, and therefore export of labour services have quadrupled between the 7
th
 and 
                                                          
1 The increase in share of exports in GDP over the first two decades after reform is very similar 
in China and India (Agarwal and Whalley, 2012). 
2 The averages in this case hide the actual pattern which was one of slight decline in the early 
part of the eighties and some increase in later years.  
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11
th
 Plans. But the really spectacular increase has been in the share of exports of non-factor 
services (NFS) in GDP and this has more than quintupled. Most of this export has been of phone 
and internet related services.  
Table 5 Indian Exports (% of GDP) 
Plans                  Goods     Non-Factor Services Net Income   Private Transfers Received        
6
Th
   (80-84)              4.7                  1.5                    0.5                  1.3 
7
Th
   (85-89)              4.7                  1.4                    0.4                   0.9 
8
Th
   (92-96)              8.3                  1.9                    0.4                   2.3 
9
Th
   (97-01)              8.9                  3.2                    0.9                   2.8  
10
Th
 (02-06)            12.1                  5.9                    2.2                   3.3  
11
th
  (07-10)            14.2                  7.6                    1.0                   3.6 
Source Reserve Bank of India 2012. 
 
However, the share of imports of goods as a share of GDP has risen even more, so the 
deficit in the balance on merchandise trade has increased considerably (Table 6). The deficit in 
merchandise trade has been increasing since the Eighth Plan and has increased particularly 
rapidly in the 11
th
 Plan, namely since mainly the financial crisis. But the huge increase in 
remittances since the Eighth Plan and later the surplus in trade in non-factor services had resulted 
in a declining current account deficit and even a surplus during some years in the 9
th
 Plan. But 
the sharp deterioration in the balance on merchandise trade in the Eleventh Plan has resulted in 
the current account deficit reaching levels it had reached just before the crisis in 1991. The 
liberalization has not resulted in an improvement in the balance on goods trade; it has, however, 
resulted in an increasing surplus on trade in non-factor services and in remittances. 
19 
 
 
Table 6  Imbalances in Indian Trade (% of GDP) 
Plans                  Goods       Non-factor Services    Net Income  Private Transfers       CAB   
6
Th
   (80-84)              -3.4                0.6                           -0.1                  1.3                  -1.5 
7
Th
   (85-89)              -3.0                 0.3                           -0.6                  0.9                 -2.2  
8
Th
   (92-96)              -2.8                 0.2                           -1.1                  2.3                 -1.1   
9
Th
   (97-01)              -3.2                 0.6                           -0.9                  2.8                 -0.9 
10
Th
 (02-06)              -4.4                2.1                           -0.7                    3.2                  0.2 
11
th
  (07-10)              -8.3                3.2                           -0.5                    3.5                 -2.2  
Source: Reserve Bank of India 2012. 
 
The size of capital flows has also been increasing. Capital flows were negligible before 
the 1991 crisis. Since then, FDI inflows have increased from 0.35 percent of GDP in the 8
th
 Plan 
(1992-96) to 2.41 percent in the 11
th
 Plan (2007-10) and portfolio flows increased from .75 
percent of GDP to 1.76 percent during this period. FDI flows have been increasing faster than 
portfolio flows; however, the latter have important implications for policy as discussed below. 
What is also important is that FDI flows are not a one-way street. Outward FDI has increased 
from a negligible amount in the 1990s to 1.23 percent in the 11
th
 Plan. Increasing capital flows 
are an indication of the ongoing overall integration of the Indian economy with the world 
economy.  
Since the mid-1990s when the exchange rate became market determined the economy 
has gone through a number of phases. Initially a flexible exchange rate was combined with 
limited capital mobility. Then capital mobility increased. In the first phase of limited capital 
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mobility a high fiscal deficit still resulted in higher interest rates and a higher current account 
deficit. But since there was limited capital mobility the higher current account deficit translated 
into a higher balance of payments (BOP) deficit and an exchange rate depreciation which 
increased exports and so resulted in a still further increase in GDP and growth accelerated. But in 
the second phase the increase in capital inflows because of the higher interest rates
1
 actually 
resulted in an appreciation of the exchange rate which slowed the growth of exports and of GDP.  
Portfolio flows which respond to interest rates are the relevant flows in the above analysis. We 
see below how portfolio flows separate India from many other developing countries and makes 
its links more similar to those among developed economies. More recently doubts raised by the 
large fiscal and current account deficits
2
 have slowed the inflow of portfolio capital and have 
resulted in a large depreciation of the exchange rate.  
An expansionary monetary policy in the US operates on other countries through two 
channels, the real and financial ones. For the real effect, expansionary monetary policy raises 
income in the US and increases imports so that exports of partner countries increase, leading to 
an appreciation of the foreign currency. The financial effect is that the expansionary monetary 
policy lowers the interest rate in the US leading to capital outflows and an appreciation of the 
foreign currency which negatively affects exports. The inflow into the other country also lowers 
its interest rate. So overall there is an appreciation of the currency, a lower interest rate, but the 
effect on exports is uncertain. 
                                                          
1 The inflows was on account of portfolio investments by foreign investors as well as foreign 
borrowings by Indian companies as foreign rates of interest rates were lower.  
2 The needs of institutional investors for funds in their home markets may have limited their 
investments in India.  
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Interrelations among the G7 are dominated by the financial effect so interest rates in 
other G7 countries fall and their exchange rates appreciate following an expansionary US 
monetary policy. But the response of developing country members is different (Agarwal and 
Essid, 2012). In the case of emerging economies such as China, Korea and Mexico the exchange 
rate usually depreciated and there was a weak tendency for the interest rate and for exports to 
rise. This is because financial linkages are weak in the case of these developing countries and the 
real effect dominates. Also developing countries are generally adopting an export oriented 
growth model and so seek to prevent an exchange rate appreciation and actually bring about a 
depreciation. The depreciation and the increased GDP seem to raise inflation and the interest rate 
is raised to control the inflation; there is apparently no fear that the higher interest rate would 
lead to capital inflows. The Indian economy behaves more like the developed economies and not 
these developing economies, in that the currency appreciates, and the interest rate and exports do 
not change. The different result is most probably because of the importance of interest sensitive 
portfolio flows.  
The increase in exports raises GDP and with a fixed money supply this would tend to 
raise the interest rate.  In current circumstances policy makers face a difficult choice because of 
the circularity of processes. Successful economic management results in confidence in the 
economy and an inflow of capital. This leads to an appreciation of the rupee and a slowdown in 
exports. This reduces the rate of growth of GDP and increases the current account deficit. These 
erode confidence and lead to a depreciation of the exchange rate. Policy makers struggle to 
provide a more stable growth process. 
The current account balance (CAB) reflects the changing savings investment balance of 
the economy. In general the household sector has a surplus of savings over investment while the 
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corporate sector and the government have deficits (Table 7). The surplus of household savings 
had been increasing till the 9
th
 Plan and since has declined. The decline during the 10
th
 Plan was 
due to a sharp increase in household investment (Table 8); but in the 11tth Plan period the rate of 
savings declined marginally.  
Table 7 Excess of Indian Savings over Investment by Sector  
                     (% of GDP, Unweighted Annual Average) 
PLANS               HOUSEHOLD  CORPORATE  GOVERNMENT   
6
Th
   (80-84)               5.9                       -2.9                     -5.9  
7
Th
   (85-89)               6.8                       -2.7                     -8.1 
8
Th
   (92-96)               9.8                       -4.3                     -6.3      
9
Th
   (97-01)             10.7                       -3.0                     -7.2      
10
Th
 (02-06)               8.9                       -5.6                     -5.9 
11
th
  (07-10)               8.7                       -8.7                     -6.2 
Source Reserve Bank of India 2012. 
 
Whereas the crisis in 1991 had been preceded by a large deterioration of the 
government’s saving investment balance because of a combination of higher investment (Table 
7) and lower savings, the worsening overall savings investment balance in more recent years has 
been because of the worsening imbalance of the corporate sector (Table7), and because of a 
sharp increase in investment by the corporate sector (Table 8) which has outpaced the increase in 
corporate savings. The picture may not look as bleak from the prospect of longer term growth 
despite the slowdown since the middle of 2011. The higher rates of investment might lead to 
high rates of growth in the future.  But this would require that the CAB be successfully managed 
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in the short run which would require higher savings by both the household and government 
sectors.    
                       
  Table 8  Indian Investment by Sector  
               (% of GDP, Unweighted Annual Average) 
 PLANS               HOUSEHOLDS  CORPORATE   PUBLIC    
6
Th
   (80-84)                   5.8                    4.4                  10.3 
7
Th
   (85-89)                   7.8                    4.6                  11.2 
8
Th
   (92-96)                    6.9                    8.0                   8.8  
9
Th
   (97-01)                   10.1                    6.9                  6.9  
10
Th
 (02-06)                   14.3                   11.7                 7.1 
11
th
  (07-09)                   14.3                   16.9                 8.2 
Source: Reserve Bank of India 2012. 
 
It is also important to note that the share of corporate investment in GDP did not 
increase in the 1980s, so even if government attitude was more pro-business in the 1980s as 
claimed by Rodrik and Subramaniam, 2005, it is not reflected in higher investment by the 
corporate sector. It is therefore difficult to isolate the mechanism by which the pro-business 
policy raised the growth rate.
1
  
 
 
                                                          
1 At that time there was discussion that Mrs Gandhi’s government was favouring the new 
business groups such as Ambanis as against the traditional groups such as the Tatas and the 
Birlas so Rodrik and Subramaniam’s claim that existing large businesses were favoured and 
benefitted may not be true.  
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Section IV Reforms and Economic Performance 
What difference have the reforms made to economic performance? We try to answer 
this question by studying the behavior of a number of indicators during the three decades, of the 
1980s, the 1990s and the first decade of the new century.  
                                     
                                  Table 9 Average Performance and its Variability 
                                                                   Average                                            Standard Deviation                       
                                             1981-90    1992-2000   2000-10         1981-90    1992-2000   2000-10 
PC GDP Growth Rate           3.25             4.13**        5.87**            2.35            2.19             2.23 
XGS (% of GDP)                  5.92           10.49          18.60                2.77            1.05              3.61 
XGS Growth Rate                5.40            13.01*        14.68**            6.96            8.96              9.88  
Remittances (% of GDP)      0.99              1.96           3.15                0.78            0.55              0.43 
CA Balance (% of GDP)     -1.67            -1.08          -0.72**             0.49            0.46              1.45 
GFCF (% of GDP)              20.98           23.08**     29.11                 8.17           0.88              3.23 
GFCF Growth Rate               6.95              6.8**       11.34**             5.14           6.17              6.82 
GDS (% of GDP)                21.01           22.85**      29.42                 8.09           1.25              3.62 
Private Capital (% of GDP)                       1.03           1.95                                    0.61             0.83 
FDI (% of GDP)                   0.04              0.49            1.64                  0.55           0.27             0.88 
ODA (% of GNI)                  0.72             0.49**         0.19                 0.68           0.23             0.08 
ODA (% of GCF)                3.49               2.00             0.64                 1.36            1.10            0.39 
** t-test Significant at 10%  * Not Significant 
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When we compare economic performance over the three decades we find that the 
behavior of the indicators is in line with the government’s objectives (Table 9). The rate of 
growth of per capita GDP was higher in the decade of the 1990s as compared to that in the 1980s, 
and further increased in the first decade of the 2000s. This growth acceleration was accompanied 
by a higher investment rate financed to a large extent by a higher rate of domestic saving as the 
current account deficit (CAD), except more recently, decreased as a percent of GDP. The 
improvement in the current account balance (CAB) was because of a rapid increase in exports of 
goods and services and in remittances. Furthermore, the smaller CAD was financed more by 
private capital inflows, including FDI, rather than aid. The importance of aid declined so if self-
sufficiency was an objective of the government it was successful in achieving its goal.  
The standard deviation of most of the series increased (Table 9); but this was mainly 
because these indicators had an increasing trend. The coefficient of variation decreased for most 
of the indicators except for the current account balance as a percentage of GDP and for ODA as a 
percentage of gross capital formation (Table 10). 
Table 10 Coefficients of Variation 
                                                    1981-90    1992-2000   2000-10   
PC GDP Growth Rate                  0.72               0.53           0.38 
XGS (% of GDP)                           0.47                0.10           0.19   
XGS Growth Rate                       1.29                 0.69          0.67 
Remittances (% of GDP)           0.78                 0.28           0.14 
CA Balance (% of GDP)            -0.29               -0.42          -2.02   
GFCF (% of GDP)                        0.39                0.04            0.11 
GFCF Growth Rate                    0.74                 0.89            0.60   
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GDS (% of GDP)                        0.38                  0.05            0.12   
Private Capital (% of GDP)                               0.59            0.42 
FDI (% of GDP)                         12.37                0.55             0.54 
ODA (% of GNI)                         0.94                0.48            0.44 
ODA (% of GCF)                         0.39                 0.55            0.61  
      
The decrease in the latter case was because of a sharp fall in the average of gross capital 
financed by aid as the standard deviation actually decreased.  The means of most of the variables 
show an increase from the period 1981-90 to 1992-2000 and a further increase in the period 
2001-2010. We next examine whether these increases in the means are significant.  When the 
period 1992-2000 is compared to the period 1981-90 we find that for 6 of the indicators the 
difference in means is significant at the 5% level using a two-tailed t-test, in one case the 
difference is significant at the 10 % level and in 5 cases it is not significant (Table 9). When we 
examine the difference in means between 1992-2000 and 2001-10, the difference is significant 
for 8 of the indicators at the 5 % level, and for 4 it is not significant. Surprisingly, the difference 
in growth rates of per capita GDP is not significant either for the period 1992-200 when 
compared to 1981-90 or when compared to 2001-10. We also find that the improvement in the 
CAB was significant between the 1980s and the 1990s but when the 1990s are compared to the 
2000s. So the improvement in the CAB was short lived.  
We can then compare the means for the period 1981-90 to the means in the period 2001-
10. The difference in means is now significant at the 5 % level for almost all the variables except 
the current account balance which is significant at the 10 % level. The only variable which 
shows no significant difference in means is the rate of growth in gross fixed capital formation. 
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This suggests that in many cases the effect of the policy change was slow acting so that there is 
less change between consecutive decades than over a longer period. Also since there seemed to 
be change in more variables in the second decade after the reforms than in the first decade there 
may be an accelerating effect of policy change. 
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Section V Social Progress 
 
A major objective of policy making in India has been to reduce poverty. Though 
poverty has been decreasing and there is an improvement in many other social indicators, 
included in the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), progress has lagged in South Asia as 
compared to other regions and within South Asia India has lagged (Table 11).    
                              Table 11 Regional Social Improvement (% decline 1990-2005)   
                       Poverty rate          Malnourishment*       Infant Mortality   Child Mortality Maternal Mortality                      
EAP                    69.3                                4.4                              45.6                        49.9                             50.0 
LAC                   27.4                                7.3                               53.0                        55.2                              35.2 
MNA                 16.3                                5.2                               50.0                        54.6                              53.2 
SA                      22.1                                4.7                               37.0                        41.9                               47.6 
SSA                    11.6                               11.6                              24.7                        26.6                               18.4 
Bangladesh       31.6                               22.9                               50.4                        55.1                              51.7 
India                   21.5                               14.2                              31.8                         35.3                              50.9 
Nepal                                                                                             51.3                         56.1                              49.4 
Pakistan             67.4                                16.3                              24.1                         26.7                              40.8 
Sri Lanka           55.8                                 24.2                              36.2                         39.8                              50.6 
 
 The decline in malnourishment is for the period 2000-08. Also for South Asia the individual 
country numbers seem to be at variance with the figure for the region. 
 EAP is East Asia and Pacific, LAC is Latin America and Caribbean, MNA is Middle East and 
North Africa, SA is South Asia and SSA is Sub-Saharan Africa. The regions are as defined by the 
World Bank. 
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The elasticity of reduction with respect to growth of per capita GDP has been low in Asia, 
except for the elasticity of reduction of poverty with respect to growth of per capita GDP in East Asia. 
Again within South Asia this elasticity has been low in India. 
                               Table 12  Elasticity of Reduction with respect to growth of per capita GDP 
                             PR                Malnourishment            IMR           CMR             MMR 
                            1990-05                2000-08           1990-2005    1990-2005     1990-2005 
EAP                      1.1                          .07                         0.4                0.5                 0.6   
LAC                      1.4                          .39                        2.6                 2.8                  1.9 
MNA                      .6                          .24                        2.0                 2.2                   2.7   
SA                           .4                           .12                        0.6                 0.7                  1.0 
SSA                        1.9                          .55                        0.8                 0.9                   0.8 
Bangladesh            .8                           1.0                         1.5                1.7                   1.6  
India                        .3                             .4                           .6                 .7                    1.1 
Nepal                                                                                  2.4                 2.7                  2.2 
Pakistan                  3.8                          1.8                        0.9                 1.1                  1.8 
Sri Lanka                1.3                          0.8                         0.8                 0.8                  1.2 
Source calculated from data in World Bank World Development Indicators World Bank 
Databank. 
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Section V Concluding Remarks 
 
We find that the Indian economy has been increasingly integrated with the world 
economy since the reforms started in 1991. The importance of exports of goods, non-factor 
services and labour services has increased. There are increasing capital inflows as well as 
outward FDI. Closer integration of financial markets has important implications for the conduct 
of economic policy in India. 
The behaviour of 12 economic indicators shows that the economy has done better after 
the reforms, in terms of the level of these indicators and also their reduced variability so that the 
economy seems to have become stable. While the growth rate of the services sector has increased 
after the reforms the growth rates of the manufacturing and service sectors are very similar 
except for the period of the 9
th
 Plan (1997-2001). 
The behaviour of exports, growth of manufacturing and services sectors, FDI, all point 
to greater similarity in economic performance between China and India than difference, if the 
performance is judged with respect to the year of the reform, 1979 for China and 1991 for India.  
South Asia has lagged behind other regions in the extent of social improvement. 
Furthermore, India has lagged within South Asia. The elasticity of improvement in social 
indicators with respect to growth of per capita GDP has been low in India. 
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